66 ideas
6887 | Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner] |
6881 | Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner] |
5439 | The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner] |
9959 | 'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner] |
9961 | 'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner] |
9958 | Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner] |
9960 | A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner] |
9957 | Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner] |
6219 | The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner] |
6888 | Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner] |
6877 | Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner] |
6880 | Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner] |
6879 | 'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner] |
6878 | A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner] |
6889 | Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner] |
6890 | Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner] |
6884 | Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner] |
6882 | Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner] |
6886 | Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner] |
6885 | Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner] |
6883 | Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner] |
5449 | Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner] |
6898 | Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner] |
6452 | 'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner] |
4783 | Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG] |
4782 | 'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG] |
20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
2170 | Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B] |
6899 | The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner] |
2171 | The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B] |
6896 | Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner] |
6897 | Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner] |
5452 | 'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner] |
21819 | Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus] |
20583 | If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20584 | Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20598 | In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20614 | People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20596 | For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20593 | The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20608 | Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
11388 | Let there be one ruler [Homer] |
20597 | If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20606 | Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20600 | Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20609 | If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20605 | Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20599 | How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20601 | Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20613 | We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20586 | Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20591 | If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20602 | Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20604 | Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20603 | One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20607 | Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20612 | If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20611 | If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20610 | Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20617 | How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20615 | Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20616 | During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20620 | If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf] |
20619 | Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
14829 | Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche] |